Gaming portfolio returns
A fundamental problem for investors is to determine whether a given portfolio is making positive returns relative to a benchmark such as the risk-free rate or a stock market index. This is a challenging problem for traditional statistical tests when little or nothing is known about the composition of the portfolio, the trading strategies the manager is using, or the amount of leverage he is taking on. The difficulty is that the manager may have both the incentive and the ability to create returns that 'look good' for extended periods of time even though in expectation they are no better than the returns obtainable from standard market instruments. In particular, the manager can inflate his returns using options trading strategies that hide large downside risks in the tail of the distribution (Lo 2001, Foster and Young 2010) . Standard measures of performance, such as Jensen's alpha and the Sharpe ratio, do not take account of this unobserved downside risk. Nor do more recent proposals, such as the class of performance measures suggested by Goetzmann et al. (2007) .
To illustrate the difficulty, consider the returns series in figure 1, which shows the monthly returns from a hypothetical portfolio over a period of 30 years. The returns appear to be i.i.d. normally distributed, and the OLS estimate of the mean monthly return over 360 months is 0.00324 with estimated standard deviation 0.000764. The t-statistic is 4.2, which implies that the returns are positive and significantly different from 0 at the 99.99% confidence level. In reality, however, the expected returns are zero. Here is how they were generated: in each month t the manager sold a covered asset-or-nothing put{ whose log probability of exercise, A t , was determined by a random draw from a normal distribution with mean 0.00275 and standard deviation 0.0144. If the put was not exercised in a given month the manager earned an excess return of e A t À 1 over and *Corresponding author. Email: peyton.young@economics.ox.ac.uk {We assume that the put is covered by the portfolio itself, which will be completely liquidated if the put is exercised.
above the risk-free rate. If the put was exercised in a given month, the fund would be completely wiped out. Assuming no arbitrage in the pricing of puts, the premium paid by the purchaser is offset by the probability that the put will be exercised and the expected excess return is zero. Under our assumptions the probability that the fund does not crash in a 30-year period (360 months) is approximately ðe À0:00275 Þ 360 % 0:37. The particular simulation shown in figure 1 is a series in which a crash did not occur. The t-test is fooled because the returns appear to be i.i.d. normal and positive on average, but there is a large potential loss that has not yet shown up in the data.
This type of manipulation is not purely hypothetical; indeed, it is in the interest of fund managers to create return series that are 'front-loaded' in order to attract clients and generate large performance bonuses (Lo 2001, Foster and Young 2010) . The question is whether one can design a statistical test that protects against type-I errors, that is, against concluding that the returns exceed some given benchmark (such as the risk-free rate or a stock index) when in fact they do not.
The answer we propose is to test whether the compound excess returns form a non-negative martingale. We first described this idea in its basic form in Foster et al. (2008) and showed how to apply it to empirical returns data. The present paper is more theoretical and shows that we can greatly increase the statistical power of this class of tests through the use of leverage. The essential idea is the following: to test the returns from a given portfolio we construct a hypothetical family of leveraged versions of the portfolio. We then form a convex combination of these leveraged portfolios and apply the martingale maximal inequality to assess the probability that the returns from the original portfolio could have been produced by chance rather than superior expertise. This approach is similar in spirit to the universal portfolio framework pioneered by Cover (1991) , but our construction is more specific and allows us to calculate the power of the test explicitly. The test is 'strategy-proof' in the sense that a manager whose strategy does not produce excess returns will fail the test with high probability. (We give a formal definition of this concept in the next section.) However, the test is asymptotically powerful in the sense that, for high confidence levels, it will pass a series of bona fide excess returns with a probability that is nearly as high as the t-test.
The compound excess returns test
Consider a portfolio whose returns A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A T are observed at regular intervals (e.g. quarterly, monthly, or daily). We assume that these returns accurately reflect the portfolio's change in value in each period, but that the process producing the returns is a 'black box', that is, the manager's strategy is unobservable. If r ft is the riskfree rate in period t, the total excess return in the period is ð1 þ A t Þ=ð1 þ r ft Þ and the net excess return isÃ t ¼ ð1 þ A t Þ=ð1 þ r ft Þ À 1.y We wish to test whether these returns are likely to have been produced by a strategy that yields positive excess returns in expectation, or whether they could have been produced by a strategy designed to fool us into thinking they are positive in expectation when in fact they are not.
The null hypothesis is that the excess returns have zero conditional expectation in every period, that is, Null hypothesis:
The alternative is that the expected net excess returns are non-negative and in some periods they are strictly positive, that is, Alternative hypothesis: E ½Ã t jÃ 1 ,Ã 2 , . . . ,Ã tÀ1 ! 0, and strict inequality holds for some t, 1 t T:
Conservative test. A hypothesis test is conservative at significance level p if it rejects the null with probability at most p when the null is true. A test is conservative if this property holds for all p 2 ð0, 1Þ. Strategy proof test. A test for excess returns is strategyproof if it is conservative for any returns process satisfying (1), that is, whenever the excess returns form a martingale difference.
We shall assume throughout that a portfolio cannot lose more than 100% of its value in any period, that is, A t ! À1 for every t.z Hence the null hypothesis can be yOne can also define the excess return relative to other benchmarks, such as the return from a broad-based stock market index. zIf the portfolio manager has short positions he could lose everything and still owe money to his creditors. However, this is a risk borne by the creditors not the investors: we assume that an investor cannot lose more than 100% of the amount invested, which places a lower bound of -1 on the net return in each period.
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Feature reformulated as follows:
Null:
ð1 þÃ s Þ is a non-negative martingale with expected value 1:
The martingale maximal inequality states that, for any non-negative martingale with expectation 1, and for any time T and target value x 4 0, the maximum of the values C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C T is greater than x with probability less than 1=x (Doob 1953) . Therefore, the following is a strategyproof test for excess returns: given any time T and significance level p 2 ð0, 1Þ, reject the null hypothesis at time T if and only if
which holds with probability less than p. We shall call this the Compound Excess Returns Test (CERT). Note that this test assumes nothing about the parametric distribution of returns within a period or the serial dependence of returns among periods. It is also extremely simple to compute. A particularly important feature of the test is that it corrects for unobserved tail risk. For example, consider the compound returns generated by the period-by-period returns in figure 1 (see figure 2) . By the end of year 30 the maximum compound value that the portfolio ever achieved was 3.42 times the size of a fund compounding at the risk-free rate. Our test says that this could happen with probability 1=3:42 ¼ 0:29. Thus we cannot reject the null with reasonable confidence. (In contrast, the t-test incorrectly rejected the null with very high confidence.)
CERT is a highly conservative test but this is unavoidable if the test is to be strategy-proof. The reason is that any sequence of positive excess returns (of any length) can be reproduced by an options-trading strategy that has, in expectation, zero excess returns. The essence of the idea can be explained as follows (for further details, see Foster and Young (2010) ). Letã 1 ,ã 2 , . . . ,ã T be a sequence of numbers that are the target excess returns over T periods. At the start of each period t, 1 t T, create a binary option that expires at the end of the period and gives the buyer of the option the right to the entire portfolio at the end of the period, including the accumulated interest over the period at the risk-free rate plus the premium from the sale of the option itself. Design the option so that the probability of exercise is p t ¼ã t =ð1 þã t Þ. Let v t be the value of the portfolio at the start of the period (including the proceeds from selling the option), and let v tþ1 be its value at the end of the period if the option is not exercised. This is a fair bet if
that is,
This is a martingale strategy that produces the excess returnã t with probability 1=ð1 þã t Þ and a total loss with probabilityã t =ð1 þã t Þ. Repeated over T periods it produces the target sequence of returnsã 1 ,ã 2 , . . . ,ã T with probability
To guard against such strategies-and a great variety of similar ones-one needs a test that is conservative with respect to the entire class of non-negative martingales. CERT is such a test. The preceding construction shows that the CERT rejection threshold is sharp: a 'gamester' can produce a series of excess returns whose compound value grows by a factor 1/p with probability p. This has some striking implications. It says, for example, that to be 95% confident that a given 'black box' portfolio is producing positive excess returns, its compound value must grow by a factor of at least 20-fold compared with a portfolio compounding at the risk-free rate. Although this may seem like an impossibly high standard to meet, it can be interpreted instead as the handicap that accompanies a complete lack of transparency. If the portfolio manager were to reveal more information about his positions and their implied tail risk, he might not need to meet such a high standard in order to convince investors that his returns are 'for real'. In subsequent sections we shall explore the effect of greater transparency in more detail, and show that the power of the test can be greatly increased if we have some information about extreme tail risk.
Related literature
There is a related literature on the testing of experts that spans both game theory and finance (Foster and Vohra 1998 , Lehrer 2001 , Shafer and Vovk 2001 , Sandroni 2003 , Olszewski and Sandroni 2008 , 2009 ). This literature emphasizes the difficulty of identifying phony experts who make probabilistic forecasts of future events without having any knowledge of the process that Feature 673 is actually governing these events. There are many ways of formalizing this problem and we shall not attempt to review them here. Broadly speaking, however, our approach differs from this literature in two key respects. First, we restrict ourselves to a particular class of stochastic processes (non-negative martingales representing returns from a financial asset) and ask whether a supposed expert is producing returns from this class or not. Second, we adopt a classical hypothesis-testing approach to assess how likely it is that a given series of returns was produced by an expert (at a given level of significance). In particular, this puts the burden of proof on the experts, who must distinguish themselves from the non-experts by producing returns that are highly unlikely to have been produced by chance. In much of the expert testing literature, by contrast, the null hypothesis is effectively reversed, and the expert is presumed to be expert unless the evidence is strongly against it. We would argue that, in the context of financial markets, it is fundamentally very difficult to consistently deliver excess returns because arbitrage opportunities tend to be eliminated through competition. Hence the natural presumption is that any given portfolio manager does not have such expertise until proven otherwise.
There is also a literature in finance that draws attention to the manipulability of traditional measures of performance, such as the Sharpe ratio and Jensen's alpha (Goetzmann et al. 2007) . These authors propose a novel class of measures that overcome some forms of manipulation. This class is defined as follows: given a series of period-by-period returns ðã 1 , . . . ,ã T Þ and a parameter 4 1, define the function
Since 1 À is negative, this measure imposes a heavy penalty on realizations in which any of the numbers 1 þã t is close to zero. The measure has the desirable property that it is invariant to the shifting of returns between periods, i.e. it makes no difference whether high returns come early or late in the sequence. Villaverde (2010) points out another problem with traditional measures, namely that they may give high marks to returns series that lack consistency; for example, there might be a few very good years early in the series and quite mediocre returns later on. He suggests a measure that incorporates consistency as well as the average magnitude of returns. In our framework we do not distinguish between steady and erratic returns as such. However, erratic returns may result in a lower final value due to volatility drag, which does affect the outcome of our test.
The main difference between these two papers and our approach is that they do not provide a test of significance-a metric for evaluating how likely it is that a given series of returns could have been produced by chance. Furthermore, unlike our test, they do not correct for unobserved tail risk.
The idea of using the martingale maximal inequality to test returns series was proposed by Foster et al. (2008) . That paper shows how the martingale approach can be applied to the analysis of actual returns series from mutual funds and stocks. The present paper takes the analysis considerably further by showing how to ramp up the power of the approach by testing a convex combination of leveraged portfolios. The present paper is also related to an earlier one on the gaming of performance fees (Foster and Young 2010) . In that paper we showed that it is essentially impossible to design bonus schemes that reward expert managers who produce excess returns, and do not reward non-experts who cannot produce such returns. In other words, there are no monetary incentive schemes that effectively distinguish between expert and non-expert types. By contrast, the present paper shows that there exist statistical criteria of performance that can in fact distinguish between the two types.
Leveraging the compound excess returns test
The compound excess returns test guards against several different types of manipulation. The one that we have emphasized so far is unrealized tail risk, that is, the possibility that the fund could suddenly go bankrupt due to a low probability event that is hidden from investors. However, even if extreme tail risk is negligible there are other reasons why portfolio returns may be highly erratic and difficult to evaluate using standard statistical methods. Some of these problems arise from common trading strategies, such as market timing or momentum based strategies. Others may result from more deliberate manipulation, such as engaging in high leverage early in the returns series and reducing the leverage later on in order to enhance a performance measure such as the Sharpe ratio.
In this section we shall propose a variant of CERT that can be applied when extreme tail risk is not an issue, either because the manager offers a guarantee against large losses, or because the investor can control the downside by purchasing portfolio insurance. This still leaves the possibility that the returns are highly non-stationary and manipulated in other ways. We shall demonstrate a variant of our test that can be applied in this case that is asymptotically as powerful as the t-test, yet makes no assumptions about the serial correlation of returns or the parametric form of the returns-generating process.
The key idea is the following: when extreme tail risk is either absent or can be controlled through the purchase of portfolio insurance, the portfolio can be leveraged. We claim that the ability to leverage greatly increases the ability of the test to discriminate between processes that generate positive excess returns and those that do not. Furthermore, the level of leverage that optimizes the power of the test does not need to be known in advance: one can be completely ignorant about the optimal amount of leverage to use and still design a test that is very powerful at high levels of statistical significance. Like the unleveraged test (CERT) this approach guards against 674 Feature type-I errors, i.e. falsely concluding that a returns series is produced by an 'expert' manager when in fact it is produced by chance. It improves on CERT in the sense that type-II errors have low probability when the returns are well-behaved, i.e. satisfy the usual assumptions of independence and log normality. As before, letÃ 1 ,Ã 2 , . . . ,Ã t be the excess returns from a portfolio in each of t periods, net of the risk-free rate. We shall assume that the portfolio can be insured against large downside losses over short periods. This can be done in several different ways. One possibility is for the portfolio manager to purchase insurance under a customized policy with an insurer. To obtain such a policy the manager would normally have to provide the insurer with considerable transparency regarding his positions and trading strategies. An alternative is for the investor to purchase protection against downside risk in the derivatives market (assuming such derivatives are available). This also presumes a certain amount of transparency, for otherwise market participants would have no way of knowing how to price the tail risk. In what follows we shall adopt the second point of view. While this is a somewhat restrictive assumption, it allows us to separate the issue of unrealized tail risk from the extent to which returns can be manipulated in other respects.
Let D be the length of a reporting period, e.g. a quarter, a month, or a day. Assume for simplicity that the price of the portfolio at the start of a given period t is $1 per share. Given a number 0 b 5 1, let t ðb, DÞ be the cost of a European put with strike price bð1 þ r ft Þ that expires at the end of the period. Suppose that we buy enough puts so that 1=ð1 þ t ðb, DÞÞ of the portfolio is in shares and t ðb, DÞ=ð1 þ t ðb, DÞÞ is in puts. Then all shares are protected and the value of the portfolio at the end of the period will be at least bð1 þ r ft Þ=ð1 þ t ðb, DÞÞ times its value at the start of the period.
Given 4 1, we can leverage this insured portfolio as follows: buy dollars of the insured portfolio and borrow À 1 dollars at the risk-free rate. Per dollar in the portfolio at the start of the period we will then have at least the following amount by the end of the period:
For this to be non-negative, it suffices that
Define b t ðÞ to be the value of b that satisfies (9) as an equality. When the cost of puts is very small, which will be the relevant case in the results to follow,
For each 4 1, let the random variable B D t ðÞ denote the return (net of the risk-free rate) from the insured portfolio constructed as above. Note that B D t ðÞ is obtained by truncating the total return 1 þÃ t below b t ðÞ, and correcting for the cost of the puts. This leads to the expression
For 0 5 1 the cost of insurance is zero, and 1 À of the portfolio is invested in the risk-free asset. In this case B D t ðÞ ¼ Ã t and the total return in period t is 1 þ Ã t . (Note that this may result in a higher compound value by reducing the volatility of the returns.)
By construction we know that
We shall say that options are competitively priced if the options market is efficient and there are no arbitrage opportunities. (This is their risk-neutral valuation.) In this case we must have
for otherwise one could make excess returns by selling portfolio insurance. It follows that, in a competitively priced options market, Y 1 s t ð1 þÃ s Þ is a non-negative martingale iff
In practice, of course, we cannot assume that options will be priced at exactly their competitive (risk-neutral) value. Fortunately, we will not need to assume this for most of our subsequent results to hold: indeed, our results on power hold even if out-of-the-money options are overpriced by a very large factor (see theorem 2 below). There is, however, very little reason to think that options are under-priced, that is, portfolio insurance is too cheap. In other words, it is reasonable to suppose that, in general,
This condition implies that
s ðÞÞ is a nonnegative supermartingale. We shall assume that this condition holds for the remainder of the paper.
Theorem 1: LetÃ 1 ,Ã 2 , . . . ,Ã T be the excess returns of a portfolio over T periods of length D ¼ 1=T. Let B D t ðÞ be the excess return in period t from an insured version of the portfolio that is leveraged at level 40, and let GðÞ be any distribution function for . The null hypothesis is that the returnsÃ t are zero in expectation. The null can be rejected at significance level p if
Proof: For each 4 0 let
The null hypothesis is that Q 1 s t ð1 þÃ s Þ is a nonnegative martingale. Assuming that options are not underpriced, C D t ðÞ constitutes a non-negative supermartingale. Therefore,
dGðÞ is a convex combination of non-negative supermartingales, which implies that it too is a Feature 675 supermartingale. Given a significance level p 4 0, it follows from the martingale maximal inequality that max 1 t T C D t 4 1=p with probability less than p (Doob 1953) . oe
We shall call the test in (16) the Leveraged Compound Excess Returns Test (LCERT) with distribution function GðÞ.
Power and leverage
We shall now show that when the distribution function GðÞ is judiciously chosen, LCERT is nearly as powerful as the optimal test when the significance level p is small. Let C ð1Þ be the continuous time, compound value of the original asset to time starting from an initial value C 0 ð1Þ ¼ 1 with ¼ 1. Suppose that the asset's value is lognormally distributed, that is, for some and ,
Here and in what follows we shall always assume that returns are expressed net of the risk-free rate. The lognormal distribution is consistent with the standard representation of asset returns as a geometric Brownian motion in continuous time, and is the basis for BlackScholes options pricing (Campbell et al. 1997) . When the asset is leveraged by a constant factor 4 0 in continuous time, its compound value C ðÞ at time is lognormally distributed:
Fix a target time * at which to test the null hypothesis at significance level p. There is no loss of generality in choosing the time scale so that Ã ¼ 1, which will be assumed throughout the remainder of the analysis. The optimal test of the null hypothesis ( ¼ 0) versus the alternative ( 4 0) is the one-sided t-test. The t-test rejects the null ( ¼ 0) at time Ã ¼ 1 if the observed value C 1 satisfies
Notice that this test is independent of the amount of leverage . Hereafter we shall usually omit the subscript 1 on the variables Z and C, it being understood that these are the realized values at the time Ã ¼ 1 when the test is conducted.
We are interested in the situation where the returns are lognormal but we do not know this a priori. (If we did we would use the t-test.) The question is how much power we lose by using LCERT, which is in principle more conservative than the t-test, because it makes no assumptions about the normality or independence of returns among periods.
Maximal power loss function. Given 4 0, D 4 0, and p 2 ð0, 1Þ, the maximal power loss function L D ð pÞ is the maximum probability over all 4 0 that the t-test correctly rejects the null ð ¼ 0Þ at level p while LCERT incorrectly accepts the null at level p.
We shall show that there exist 'universal' distributions GðÞ such that L D ð pÞ is small when: (i) the value of p is small; (ii) the observation time increments D are short, (iii) put options are competitively priced.
In fact, we can weaken the last condition considerably. Let us say that puts are conservatively priced if there exists a constant K ! 1 such that the cost of a put is at most K times its risk-neutral valuation.
Theorem 2: LetÃ 1 ,Ã 2 , . . . ,Ã T be the excess returns of a portfolio over T periods of length D :¼ 1=T. Let B D t ðÞ be the excess return in period t from an insured version of the portfolio that is leveraged at level 40. The null hypothesis is that the returnsÃ t are zero in expectation. The null can be rejected at significance level p if
Suppose, in addition, that portfolio insurance is conservatively priced and the returnsÃ t come from a lognormal process. Given any " 4 0, if p is sufficiently small, and D is sufficiently small given p, the maximal power loss from the test (21) is less than ".
Before turning to the proof, several remarks are in order.
Remark 1: We know from theorem 1 that the first statement (21) holds for any cumulative distribution function GðÞ. Thus it holds in particular for the distribution GðÞ ¼ 1=ð1 þ Þ, which implies dGðÞ ¼ d=ð1 þ Þ 2 : The essential claim of the theorem is that, under this particular c.d.f., plus several fairly weak conditions on the cost of insurance, the maximal power loss goes to zero with p. Other distribution functions also have this property; the key conditions are that the distributions have full support on the positive reals and be fairly 'flat'.
Remark 2: The test in theorem 2 is 'universal' in the sense that it can be applied with no prior knowledge of the actual distribution of returns. In particular, there is no presumption that the distribution is lognormal. The theorem states that if the returns happen to be lognormal, we do not lose much power by applying our test. At the same time we protect ourselves against type-I errors in the event that the returns are not lognormal (this follows from theorem 1). This is a luxury that the t-test does not permit.
The universal aspect of the test is similar in spirit to Cover's pioneering work on universal portfolios (Cover 1991) . Cover showed that a convex combination of leveraged portfolios will grow at a rate that is asymptotically as fast as the growth rate of an optimally leveraged portfolio. This is true in our set-up as well. However, our focus is on deriving an asymptotic bound on the maximum power loss relative to a lognormal distribution. This requires a more specific choice for the distribution of 676 Feature leverage levels; it also requires factoring in the cost of portfolio insurance, which is not a feature of Cover's framework.
Remark 3: The proof will show that it suffices to be able to insure the portfolio against large downside losses over short periods of time at a cost that is not unboundedly larger than the risk-neutral value of the options. In particular, we do not assume that the options market is so complete or well-priced that one could simply deduce the distribution of returns from the options prices themselves.
Remark 4: The test is most powerful when the level of significance is high (i.e. p is small). The logic of this may be explained as follows. Suppose, for example, that p ¼ 0.001. Then the compound value of the leveraged portfolio must grow by a factor of 1000 to pass our test. This is clearly very demanding, but in this case the t-test is also very demanding. The substance of the argument is to show that when the portfolio returns are lognormally distributed and they pass the t-test at a high level of significance, then the leveraged compound value is likely to pass our test as well. Moreover, we would argue that small values of p are especially relevant in the context of financial markets, where there are many funds to choose from. For example, if there are N funds and we want to know whether the best of them is able to beat the market, we must correct for the fact that pN of them will pass at significance level p purely by chance. The Bonferroni correction for multiplicity implies that to be confident at level p that the best of N funds is run by an expert who can beat the market, it must pass at significance level p/N.
Proof of theorem 2:
The first statement of the theorem (21) follows immediately from theorem 1, expression (16). The essence of theorem 2 is the second statement, namely that for this particular distribution of leverage levels the power loss is arbitrarily small when p and D are sufficiently small. This result will be established in two steps. First we shall show that the power loss would be small if the portfolio could be leveraged continuously (D ¼ 0); then we shall show that the conclusion still holds when D is sufficiently small but not zero. (Note that, in our framework, the portfolio cannot be leveraged continuously because time periods are discrete. If continuous leveraging were possible, then we would be assuming that the price of the portfolio can be represented as a continuous-time process, which would restrict the distribution much more than we wish to do.)
For each 4 0, let CðÞ :¼ C 1 ðÞ denote the compound value of the portfolio at time Ã ¼ 1 when it is continuously leveraged at level . By assumption,
Define the random variable
Completing the square, (22) can be rewritten as follows:
where
From (24) and (25) we deduce that
Making the change of variable z :¼ À w, we obtain
Let NðÁÞ denote the cumulative normal distribution. For any given value of w we have
ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2 p gðz= þ w=Þdz ¼ E ½ gðz= þ w=Þj À w z w½NðwÞ À NðÀwÞ 4 gðw=Þ½NðwÞ À NðÀwÞ:
The last inequality follows from the convexity of gðÞ :¼ 1=ð1 þ Þ 2 and Jensen's inequality. From (28) and (29) 
Note that this derivation holds for any convex density gðÁÞ on the positive reals. This fact allows our results to be extended to various other distributions, though for the sake of concreteness we shall conduct the remainder of the proof using the specific density gðÞ ¼ 1=ð1 þ Þ 2 . In this case, (30) 
This obviously implies that C :¼ C 1 1=p. On the other hand, the t-test rejects the null at level p if
Therefore, the following overestimates the probability of power loss, that is, L 0 ð pÞ is less than Pðz p 5 w and C 1=pÞ: ð34Þ 
Taking logs of both sides we can rewrite this as follows:
Define the number
From (34)- (38) we deduce that the maximum power loss at significance level p is strictly less than Pðw 2 I p Þ, where the interval I p is defined as follows: 
Lemma 2.1: The length of the interval I p goes to zero as p goes to zero.
Proof: Let " 4 0. First we shall show that
Then we shall show that c p À z p 5 " for all sufficiently small p:
From these two statements it follows that jI p j 5 2", and hence that jI p j ! 0 as p ! 0:To establish (40), note that w 2 I p implies z p 5 w, which implies
From this we conclude that
and hence
We know that z p ! 1 as p ! 0. Since w 4 z p , it follows that w ! 1 as p ! 0. Hence the right-hand side of (44) is smaller than " for all sufficiently small p. This establishes (40).
To prove the lemma, it remains to establish (41), namely c p À z p 5 " for all sufficiently small p. We can estimate the value of z p using the tail approximation for the normal distribution (Feller 1971, p.193) :
From (45) we deduce that
Hence c p À z p 5 2 lnð2Þ þ 2 ln z
Clearly, the right-hand side of (47) is less than " when p is sufficiently small. This establishes (41). Together with (40), it follows that the length of the interval I p is less than 2" for all sufficiently small p. oe
The preceding shows that, given 4 0 and a small " 4 0, for all sufficiently small p the power loss L 
By definition, w ¼ z þ = where z is Nð0, 1Þ. Hence, given and ", for all sufficiently small p40,
ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2 p dz 5 2"=2:
We have therefore shown that, for every given , the maximum power loss over all is arbitrarily small provided that p is sufficiently small and the portfolio is leveraged continuously. It remains to be shown that this statement remains true when the portfolio is leveraged over discrete time intervals of sufficiently short duration. Recall that the number of discrete periods is T ¼ 1=D where D 4 0 is the length of a period. Fix some 4 0. Given a particular leverage level 4 0, the compound value of the leveraged insured portfolio at the time the test is conducted is
Integrated over all leverage levels, the value of the portfolio is
We wish to compare the following values at the time Ã ¼ 1 when the test is conducted: We claim that, when D is small, C D =C is close to one with high probability in the region where power loss occurs.
To establish this claim, recall that we estimated power loss in the continuously leveraged case by writing (see 678 Feature
The integral can be broken into two parts as follows:
ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2 p gðz= þ w=Þdz:
In our previous estimation of C we dropped the second term in this expression (see (29)). In particular, we showed that power loss becomes arbitrarily small as p ! 0 even when we underestimate C by ignoring the realizations of z ¼ À w that are greater than w.
Restricting z ¼ À w to the interval ½Àw, w is equivalent to restricting to the interval ½0, 2w=. From the first part of the proof we know that, for all sufficiently small p40, w c p þ " and a fortiori w c p þ 1. Thus we already know that the power loss becomes arbitrarily small when we apply our test to the valuẽ
It remains to be shown that the power loss becomes arbitrarily small when we apply our test to the corresponding discrete-time valuẽ
As before, let ð, DÞ denote the cost of insuring one dollar's worth of the portfolio for a period of length D at a strike price that allows leveraging at level 4 1. Since the process is i.i.d. we can assume this cost is the same in all periods. When D is small the cost ð, DÞ is small; moreover, the required strike price is approximately equal to 1 À 1=, as observed earlier (see expression (10)). Let qð, DÞ be the probability that a put option with these characteristics is exercised. In other words, qð, DÞ is the probability that the portfolio loses at least 1= of its value by the end of the period. By assumption, the logarithm of the portfolio excess return over a period of length D has the distribution NðD À 2 D=2, 2 DÞ for some ! 0. In an efficient market, the cost of such an option is the probability of exercise times the conditional value if exercised, under the risk-neutral assumption that ¼ 0. Since the conditional value when exercised is less than 1, the cost ð, DÞ of such an option satisfies ð, DÞ qð, DÞ % Pðx lnð1 À 1=ÞÞ, ð56Þ
and z is Nð0, 1Þ. When 4 1 we have the inequality lnð1 À 1=Þ 5 À1=. Hence for all sufficiently small D 4 0,
The following inequality holds for all sufficiently small D 4 0:
From (57), (58), and the standard approximation of the tail of the normal we conclude that, for all sufficiently small D,
In fact, we are only assuming that options are conservatively priced, that is, for some constant K ! 1, ð, DÞ is at most K times the risk-neutral price. Therefore, ð, DÞ is at most K times the probability of exercise qð, DÞ, hence
To leverage the insured portfolio at level requires buying puts per period for T ¼ 1=D periods. This reduces the compound growth of the portfolio by a factor of at most 1 À ð1 À ð, DÞÞ 1=D , which by (60) is at most
Note that when D is sufficiently small, this factor is smaller than " for all 1 5 . Thus the cost of the options does not reduce the compound value of the portfolio by very much when the time periods are short.
There are, however, two further 'costs' to insuring the portfolio. First, there is a positive probability that the value of the insured portfolio will fall to zero at some time before the test is conducted; in fact, this occurs in any period where the options are exercised. (By contrast, the value of a continuously leveraged, lognormally distributed asset almost surely never reaches zero.) The second potential cost is that the value of the portfolio over each time period does not exactly follow a lognormal distribution, because the quantities of the portfolio and the risk-free asset are not rebalanced to keep the leverage constant within each period. To complete the proof of theorem 2, we need to show that with high probability these factors have only a small effect on the cumulative value of the portfolio when the test is conducted.
The preceding argument shows that when D is sufficiently small, the cost of the puts reduces the value of the insured portfolioC D by a factor less than " (compared withC). This assumes, however, that the puts are not exercised: if in any period a put is exercised, the value of the insured portfolio drops to zero. From (59) we know that the probability of this event is at most
The latter can be made less than " by taking D to be sufficiently small. We have therefore shown that, for all sufficiently small D: (i) the probability is less than " that the discrete-time portfolioC D will go bankrupt; (ii) if it does not go bankrupt, the cost of the puts decreases the value by a factor less than " compared withC.
Feature 679 Finally, we must consider the fact that the discrete-time portfolio does not grow at exactly the same rate as the continuously leveraged portfolio within each period. The difference between the two rates is small in any given period with high probability; we claim that the cumulative difference over 1=D periods is also small with high probability.
To establish this claim, fix :¼ 2ðc p þ 1Þ=. Let R t ðÞ be the growth rate in period t of the portfolio when continuously leveraged at level throughout the period. Let R D t ðÞ be the growth rate of the discrete-time portfolio when leveraged at level at the start of period t. The following shows that the cumulative difference between these two rates over T periods is very small with high probability.
Lemma 2.2: If D is sufficiently small,
À R t ðÞÞ 5 " with probability at least 1 À ".
Proof:
The growth rate of the continuously leveraged portfolio in period t is
The growth rate of the discrete-time portfolio in period t is
Note that the random variable Z t is Nð0, 1Þ and is the same in the two expressions. From the Taylor expansion e (63) can be written as follows:
The coefficient on the residual term, f ðÞ, depends on , , and , but the latter two are fixed whereas is not. Similarly, we have
Therefore, we can express the difference between the growth rates as follows for some bounded function hðÞ:
Next we estimate the cumulative difference over T ¼ 1=D periods:
The T draws of Z t are independent, Z 
Therefore, the overall difference in growth rates between the two portfolios is approximately
where W is Nð0, 1Þ:
For a given value of , we can make this difference less than " with probability at least 1 À " by choosing D to be sufficiently small, say 0 5 D D . oe
To complete the proof of theorem 2, let us recall that we are estimating the loss of power in the worst case, that is, for values of that maximize the probability of accepting the null when the t-test rejects. When is sufficiently large, say greater than , the probability that our test accepts the null is less than ", hence the power loss must also be less than ". (This is an immediate consequence of expression (19).) Thus in expression (70) 
We already know, however, that the maximum power loss goes to zero as p goes to zero for the continuously leveraged portfolioC. It follows from (71) that the same holds for the insured discrete-time portfolio C D . This completes the proof of theorem 2. oe
Targeting the leverage
Theorem 2 demonstrates the existence of a strategy-proof test that has good power even when one has no prior information about the variance of the underlying process. However, the maximal power loss function is difficult to calculate explicitly because of its dependence on the unknown and on the significance level p of the test. We can obtain a clearer picture of the magnitude of the power loss if we assume that is known with high accuracy to begin with. In this case we do not need to integrate over a distribution of leverage levels; we can instead choose a single level that optimizes the power of the test conditional on our estimate of . This situation is summarized in the following result. 
The null hypothesis is that the returnsÃ t are zero in expectation. The null can be rejected at level p if
If portfolio insurance is conservatively priced and D is sufficiently small, and if the estimate Ã is correct, the maximal power loss of this test is at most
Proof of theorem 3: We shall estimate the power loss in the continuous case, from which the conclusion in the discrete case follows by arguments similar to those in the proof of theorem 2. When the portfolio is continuously leveraged at level 4 0, its value at the time when the test is conducted (
, where z is Nð0, 1Þ:
Power loss occurs when ln CðÞ 1=p and the t-test rejects the null, that is, when
The probability of this event is minimized when the righthand side is as small as possible, which occurs (for a given and ) when ¼ c p =. Call this the optimal amount of leverage
Given our estimate Ã , we will use the optimal amount of leverage provided our estimate of is accurate, which is assumed in the statement of the theorem. The important point is that the optimal leverage does not depend on (which is assumed to be unknown).
Substituting the optimal Ã into (76) and rearranging terms, we conclude that power loss occurs when
For a given and p, the probability of event (78) is maximized when = lies halfway between z p and c p , that is, when
Therefore the power loss is at most
¼ Nððc p À z p Þ=2Þ À Nððz p À c p Þ=2Þ ¼ 2Nððz p À c p Þ=2Þ À 1:
However, we already know from (41) that ðz p À c p Þ ! 0 as p ! 0: oe We are now in a position to compare the maximal power loss of our test when is known and when is unknown. The first case is covered by theorem 3 and the second by theorem 2. These are admittedly somewhat extreme situations; in practice, one might have a preliminary estimate (or guess) about that is subject to some uncertainty. In this case one could choose a universal distribution of leverage levels that is centered around one's best guess (as we shall show explicitly below), and one would be protected if one's guess turns out to be wrong.
To fix ideas let us begin by considering the maximal power loss when is known. In this case we have the upper bound f ð pÞ ¼ 2Nððz p À c p Þ=2Þ À 1:
The solid curve in figure 3 shows the behaviour of f ð pÞ for small values of p. Of course, this is only a theoretical upper bound on the maximal power loss, and it was obtained by making a number of approximations. The most significant of these was that we estimated the power loss using the compound value of the portfolio at the time the test is conducted rather than its maximal value up to the time that the test is conducted. The squares in figure 3 represent the power loss over many simulations under the null hypothesis when this weaker test is used. The close correspondence between the squares and the curve show that our estimate, f ð pÞ, is quite close to the actual power loss using this weaker test. When we simulate the process using the stronger test (based on the maximal compound value), we obtain the dotted line shown in figure 3 . This shows that the actual power loss from the test is considerably smaller than the theoretical upper bound in (81). For example, when p ¼ 0.001 the maximal power loss (based on simulations) is on the order of 15%, whereas the upper bound we Feature 681 computed is about 25%. A 15% chance of a type-II error
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a test of portfolio returns that is appropriate when an investor has no knowledge of the portfolio manager's investment strategy. First, the test protects against the possibility that there is unrealized tail risk. This is important because managers typically have a strong incentive to take on such risk in order to enhance their performance bonuses. The level of risk can be low and still create the appearance of sizable excess returns before the risk is realized. For example, an annual excess return equal to 5% is impressive, yet it can be driven by tail risk that in expectation will take 20 years to show up. Second, the test is valid for returns that are serially dependent and not normally distributed, a situation that can easily result from dynamic trading strategies and market timing schemes. Third, while the test is inherently conservative, it can be turned into a powerful test if we have some information about the price of insuring against extreme tail risk. Contrary to what one might expect, the price of insurance need only be roughly correct-say within an order of magnitude of the risk-neutral pricefor the test to have high power. Feature 683
